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misconduct was found insufficient to fasten guilt upon him.
This reasoning
fails to recognize that the same alleged recklessness is the basis of both prosecutions. The judgment of acquittal would seem to have established conclusively
that the defendant was not acting illegally at the time the victims were killed .4
By failing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the defendant may be
obliged to return again and again to relitigate the same issue. The defendant
in a criminal case should have the right to claim finality as to any fact previously determined in his favor. In People v. Allen,44 which follows the majority
rule, the dissenting justices, recognizing this fact, said ". . . under the rule announced in this case a citizen may be tried an indefinite number of times for
the same criminal act until a jury is finally found which will render a verdict
suitable to the prosecution. Under this rule, if a grossly negligent act should
result in a large number of deaths, the defendant might be tried as many
different times as there were deaths involved. Even though jury after jury
might find that he had not been grossly negligent, he could be compelled to
return again and again to stand trial on this one point, which is the gist of the
5
case.)

'4

The primary object of penal sanctions is to deter crime and to insure the
peace and safety of the community. In the typical automobile manslaughter
situation the state is not dealing with a confirmed felon. The majority sometimes appear to forget this as they stretch legal precepts, very often applicable
only in the civil forum. It is natural that judges, as every citizen, should view
the rising death rate on our highways with concern. But it is difficult to
believe that the solution rests in fashioning rules of law out of legal fictions.
One wonders whether any law which subjects a defendant to what may amount
to life imprisonment for one careless act, however regrettable its toll, is compatible with our concept of justice.
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT AND THE
CONTROVERSIAL HOT CARGO CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION

May coercion be brought by the employees of an employer not involved in a
labor dispute to restrain him from doing business with another employer involved in a labor controversy? Such coercion usually takes the form of a
strike or a concerted refusal to work on the part of the employees of the neutral or secondary employer. If the economic pressure is effective, the secondary employer is forced to discontinue business with the disputant or primary
employer.'
42.

200 Minn. at 50, 273 N.W. at 356.

43. See note 41 supra.
44. 368 Ill.
368, 14 N.E.2d 397 (1937), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 511 (1939).
45. Id. at 388, 14 N.E.2d at 407 (dissenting opinion). See Kirchheimer, The Act,
The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 Yale L.J. 513, 526-27 (1949).
1. At common law such work stoppages could be enjoined.
The Labor Injunction 43 (1930).

See Frankfurter & Greene,
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With the passage of the Norris-La Guardia Act 2 in 1932 these concerted
refusals were immunized from injunction, but section 8(b)(4)(A) of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 19473 now declares the inducement by a
union or its agents of employees of a secondary employer to participate in
concerted refusals to work to be an unfair labor practice. The limited scope
of the section has caused some doubt as to its efficacy. The difficulty arises
when the secondary employer has agreed, as a part of the collective bargaining
contract with the union, to the insertion of a clause giving his employees the
right to refuse to handle the goods of an "unfair employer," that is, one engaged in a dispute with a labor union. This agreement is known as a "hot
cargo" clause. The courts and the National Labor Relations Board are generally in agreement that a hot cargo clause is not illegal per se,4 but legality
of the enforcement of the clause has stirred doubts.
POSITION OF THE NLRB
The National Labor Relations Board first encountered the problem in the
case of Conway's Express.5 There the union made an agreement with a group
of employers whereby it reserved the right to refuse to handle the goods of
any employer involved in a labor dispute. When the dispute arose, the union
advised the employees of the secondary employer not to handle the goods.
The Board held that the union inducement was not a violation of section
8(b) (4) (A) since they were only encouraging the employees to exercise their
rights under the hot cargo clause in their employment contract, and the employers acquiesced in the concerted refusal of the employees in accord with
their advance agreement. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit 7 which stated: "Consent in advance to honor a hot
cargo clause is not the product of the unions' forcing or requiring any employer .. . to cease doing business with any other person." 8
2.

29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-15

(1952).

3. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1952). The section provides:
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ...
"(4) to engage in or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage
in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring
any employer . . . or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor or manufacturer, or
to cease doing business with any other person. ...
4. General Drivers Union v. NLRB, 247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 26 U-S.L.
Week 3116 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1957) (No. 273); Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F2d 906 (2d Cir.
1952); McCallister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954).
5. 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), enforcement granted sub nom. Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d
905 (2d Cir. 1952).

6. S7 N.L.R.B. at 9S3.
7. Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
8. Id. at 912. The Conway doctrine was followed in Pittsburgh Plate Glas Co., 105
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The Board at present takes the position that hot cargo clauses as such are

not contrary to public policy.9 Nevertheless, it has abandoned its original
decision in Conway's Express and holds that it is an unfair labor practice to
encourage union men to exercise rights under the clause. The retreat from
Conway's Express was first indicated by Chairman Farmer in his concurring
opinion in McCallister Transfer, Inc.'0 There the employees, under the
terms of a hot cargo contract, refused to handle goods, although the secondary

employers vainly posted notices directing them to do so. The Chairman recognized the legality of a boycott obtained with employer consent, but he found
coercion present since the employers did not immediately acquiesce. His
decision, therefore, was based on the reaction of the secondary employer to
the invocation of the hot cargo clause by the union."'
In Sand Door and Plywood Co.,' 2 the Board overruled its earlier decision

in Conway's Express. Its holding was not based on the theory of the acquiescence of the employer in the conduct of the union, since the employer remained

silent, but rather on the ground that the union had no right to instruct employees to cease handling goods, and that any refusal on the part of the em-

ployees to handle the goods without the employer's instruction constituted

an unfair labor practice.' 3 Invocation of the hot cargo clause was, therefore,
no defense and the refusal was violative of section 8(b) (4) (A) if the secondary employer did not express his acquiescence.
In American Iron and Mach. Works Co.,1 4 under similar facts, the doctrine of the Sand Door case was extended by the Board so that the mere inThere the Board further pointed out that in order to have a
N.L.R.B. 740 (1953)
violation of section 8(b)(4)(A) the employees must be found to have been within the
"course of employment" requirement of the act, and since the goods of an unfair employer are excluded under the clause, those goods are not within the "course of employment" requirement.
9. Sand Door and Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1210, 1215 (1955) states: "Insofar
as such contracts govern the relations of the parties thereto with each other, we do not
regard it our province to declare them contrary to public policy."
10. 110 N.L.R.B. 1769, 1788 (1954).
11. Two of the majority Board members argued that upholding hot cargo clauses
would permit the secondary employer to waive a right which was not his alone, and
concluded that the Conway doctrine should be overruled. The two dissenting members
of the Board, considered Conway's Express as authority for enforcing compliance with
the contract. They regarded section 8(b)(4)(A) as designed only for the protection of
the secondary employer.
12. 113 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955), enforcement granted subnom. NLRB v. Local 1976,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1956).
13. 113 N.L.R.B. at 1216. The "course of employment" argument propounded in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953), was denounced. The Board pointed out
that by the phrase Congress merely intended to distinguish between individuals in their
capacity as employees and in their capacity as consumers. Id. at 1211.
14. 115 N.L.R.B. 800, enforcement denied sub. nom. General Drivers Union v. NLRB
247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. granted, 26 U.S.L. Week 3116 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1957) (No.
273).
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ducement or encouragement by the union through appeals to employees to
refuse to handle hot cargo precluded enforcement of the clause, regardless of
employer acquiescence in the demands of the labor organization.'s This decision in effect makes hot cargo clauses null and void, for even if the secondary
employer unilaterally decides to honor his agreement, the union may not under
penalty of violating section 8 (b) (4) (A) notify its members that the contract
is in force.' 6
CONFLICT AmONG THE CIRcuIT COURTS

The position taken by the Board in the Sand Door case has been approved
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,17 and more recently by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.' 8 These federal courts of appeal have
based their reasoning upon the fact that the primary intent of Congress in enacting the section was the protection of the public

.. .

. from strikes or con-

certed refusals interrupting the flow of commerce at points removed from
the primary labor-management disputes."' 9 They further stress that the allowance of the otherwise invalid conduct through contractual assent would
be contrary to the express language of the statute and would frustrate the intent of the legislaturePI
On the other hand, in the most recent decisions' handed down by the courts
of appeal, the view of the Board in relation to the enforcement of hot cargo
clauses has not been upheld. For example, in Gcncral Drives Union v. NTLRBm

the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the Board's holding in American Iron and Mach. Works Co.2 3 holding that the ruling of the
15.

Id. at S01.

16. See dissenting opinion in American Iron and Mach. Works Co., 115 N.L.R.B. at
806.
17. NLRB v. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL, 241 F2d 147 (9th
Cir. 1957).

18. NLRB v. Local 11, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL, 242 F.2d 932 (6th
Cir. 1957).
19. Id. at 936. In H.R. Rep. No. 245, S0th Cong., 1st Se:s. 4 (1947) Represantative
Hartley observed that ". . the committee was impressed by the absolute necesity of
steering a course which would recognize the rights of all interested parties in labor relations and which would be scrupulously fair to each-the employer, the employc
and the
public. VWhie the rights of the public must, in the last analysis, be treated as paramount,

it was the belief of the committee, that, except in extraordinary circumstances, the right
of the public will be adequately protected if in turn adequate protection is afforded to
employers and employees in the exercise of their legitimate rights."
20. 242 F.2d at 936.
21. The significance of the judicial conflict is pointed up by the contrary decision in
April 1957 in NLRB v. Local 11, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL, 2.42 F-2d 932
(6th Cir. 1957).
22. 247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. granted, 26 U.S.L. Week 3116 (U.S. Oct 14,
1957) (No. 273).
23. 115 N.L.R.B. 800 (1956).

526
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Board would in effect render nugatory the hot cargo clause itself, leaving the
employees without adequate remedy.
There is no judicial conflict in regard to the decision in the General Drivers
case, since none of the other decisions have completely disregarded the concept of employer acquiescence. However, the language of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeal indicates that it is opposed to the views expressed
by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. The court pointed out that the employees
of the secondary employer were urged by the union not to handle the freight
of an unfair employer. Under the agreement with the secondary employers,
the latter had agreed that their employees would not be required to handle unfair goods. Therefore, when they did what they had a legal right to do under
the agreement, it cannot be said that they engaged in a strike or refusal to
work. The court further stated: "Nor can it be said that there was a 'forcing'
or requiring of an employer to cease doing business with another person, because the employer was only being compelled to live'24up to its own voluntary
contract entered into in advance of the happening.
The latest case in which the problem was encountered is Milk Drivers
Union v. NLRB. 25 Presented with facts similar to those in McCallister Transfer, InC.,2 6 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the order
handed down by the Board in Crowley's Milk Co., Inc.27 The court, basing
its decision on the holding in Rabouin v. NLRB 28 found no violation of section 8(b) (4) (A). Furthermore, it rejected the Board's position as stated in
the Sand Door and McCallister cases because of its failure ". . . to distinguish between instances of employer coercion and instances of employer consent, '29 and because of its disregard of the statutory
requirement for a strike
0
or concerted refusal in the course of employment A
INTENT OF CONGRESS

The conflict among the courts and the NLRB seems to be rooted in the
actual intent of Congress in the enactment of section 8(b) (4) (A), and the
plain meaning of the statutory language. Prior to the passage of the section
it was generally agreed that the section was aimed at banning all secondary
boycotts.31 However, when it was actually drafted it made no specific reference to secondary boycotts, but merely outlawed the principal means by which
24.

247 F.2d at 74.

25.
26.
27.

245 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1957).
110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954).
116 N.L.R.B. 1408 (1956).

28.

195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).

29. Milk Drivers Union v. NLRB, 245 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1957).
30. Ibid. The court pointed out that since the "normal" work to be performed was
set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, there could be no strike or refusal to
work within the statute unless the refusal was in relation to the "normal" work. This
position is closely allied to that stated in the Board's decision of Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953). See note 8 supra.
31. See 64 Yale L.J. 1201, 1206 (1955).
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they could be achieved, that is, union inducement of a concerted refusal to
work.2 The proponents of the theory that Congress' primary intent was the
public protection are opposed to the views set forth by the General Drivers
and Milk Drivers cases. 33 They feel that albeit the secondary employer may
waive his individual rights under the section, he has no right to waive the
rights of others who would be ultimately affected by a work stoppage, namely,
the public. On the other hand, these cases are endorsed by those who feel
that the paramount purpose of the section is the protection of neutral employers from strikes resulting from their desire for goods produced by a disputant employer. This view is based on the premise that by their becoming
parties to hot cargo contracts the employers agree not to use such goods, and,
therefore, are not in need of such protection. 34
CONCLUSION

The conflict over the invocation of hot cargo clauses by labor unions
charged with violations of section 8(b)(4)(A) will probably be resolved by
the Supreme Court in the near future. Chief Judge Clark, in his opinion in
the Milk Drivers case, wisely stressed that the problem should be solved without going behind the clear language of section 8(b) (4) (A).3 The rationale
of his decision is more sound than that of the NLRB which disregards the
language of the section. However, the Supreme Court may well take a position different from either of the conflicting views by declaring that hot cargo
clauses are illegal per se. This position is consonant with the policy of the
Labor Management Relations Act which is designed to protect the citizens
of the United States in connection with labor disputes a g It also adheres to
the language of section 8 (b) (4) (A), since there is a "requiring" of the secondary employer to cease dealing with another by the very terms of the hot
cargo agreement itself. Moreover, if the statute is finally interpreted so as
to declare hot cargo clauses illegal per se, the existence of the anomalous situation under the Board's view, whereby the clause is legal of itself but is incapable of enforcement, will be averted. 37
32.
33.
34.
35.
gential

29 U.S.C.A. § 1SS(b)(4) (A) (1952).
See note 19 supra.
See H.R. Rep. No. 510, Sath Cong., 1st Seas. 43 (1947).
The court stated in relation to section 3(b)(4)(A): "We do not think such tanlegislative history authorizes us to go behind the clear language." 245 F.2d at 821.

36. Section 1(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act states: "It is the purpoze and
policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of commerce, . . . to definc,

and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce
and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the ri4hts of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C.A. § 141(b) (1952).
37. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), where a racially restrictive covenant was

unenforceable, although the covenant itself was not held to be illegal.

